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Our contribution allows to recover price-cost margins at the upstream and downstream levels
as well as xed fees of two-part tari¤ contracts using the industry structure and estimates of
demand parameters. Empirical evidence on the market for bottles of water in France shows
that two part tari¤ contracts are used without resale price maintenance and that the buyer
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xed fees and prots across manufacturers and retailers.
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1 Introduction
Many industries present horizontal and vertical oligopoly structures where upstream sellers
deal with downstream buyers. This is particularly the case in markets where manufacturers sell
their products through retailing chains, for example for most processed food items in supermar-
kets. These vertical relationships matter considerably for the nal price setting by retailers, for
competition and market power analysis. The nature of contracts and the sharing of rents in the
vertical chain are then important determinants of equilibrium outcomes.
This paper proposes the rst identication and estimation of a vertical contracting structu-
ral model taking explicitly into account the buyer power of downstream players facing non linear
contracts such as two part tari¤ contracts o¤ered by the upstream level. We consider contracts
between manufacturers and retailers whose buyer power comes from the horizontal competition of
manufacturers. We also consider the case where manufacturers could use another contingency in
contracting such as resale price maintenance. Using industry structure and estimates of demand
parameters, our contribution shows how to recover price-cost margins at the upstream and downs-
tream levels as well as xed fees of two part tari¤ contracts in these di¤erent structural models.
This allows to recover completely the prots of all rms in the industry.
Recent works in empirical industrial organization have started taking into account the strategic
behavior of retailers in the vertical chain as intermediaries between upstream producers and consu-
mers. As information on wholesale prices, on marginal costs of production or distribution, and on
vertical restraints are generally di¢ cult to observe, methods often rely on demand side data and
require a structural modelling of the supply side. Usual empirical industrial organization methods
propose to address the estimation of price-cost margins using structural models of competition on
di¤erentiated products markets such as cars, computers, breakfast cereals, beer (Berry, 1994, Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, Nevo, 1998, 2000, 2001, Pinkse and Slade, 2004, Slade, 2004, Ivaldi
and Martimort, 1994, Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005, Dubois and Jodar-Rosell, 2010). Recent research
studies identication with relaxed assumption on strategic behavior (Rosen, 2007) or using only
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some best response behavior (Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii, 2015). For long, most papers in this
literature assumed that retailers act as neutral pass-through intermediaries or charge exogenous
constant margins as if manufacturers directly set consumer prices. Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi
(2003) showed the important role of distributors on prices and the strategic role of retailers has
been recently emphasized in the economics and marketing empirical literatures. While each paper
having its own focus, a stream of research introduces an explicit consideration of the strategic role
of retailers (for example, Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Manuszak (2010), Mortimer (2008), Ho
(2006), Ho, Ho and Mortimer (2012), Sudhir (2001), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2004), Asker (2005),
Villas-Boas (2007), Hellerstein (2008), Meza and Sudhir (2010)). In particular, Sudhir (2001) consi-
ders the strategic interactions between manufacturers and a single retailer on a local market and
focuses on a linear pricing model leading to double marginalization. Meza and Sudhir (2010) study
how private labels a¤ect the bargaining power of retailers. Ho (2006) studies the welfare e¤ects of
vertical contracting between hospitals and health maintenance organizations in the US. Ho (2009)
looks at the role of managed care health insurers on the choice of hospitals using the inequality
framework of Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2015). Asker (2005) considers the role of foreclosure in
the strategic choices of vertical contracts on the beer market. Hellerstein (2008) explains imperfect
pass-through again in the beer market. Manuszak (2010) studies the impact of upstream mergers
on retail gasoline markets using a structural model allowing downstream prices to be related to
upstream price mark-ups and wholesale prices chosen by upstream gasoline reneries. Hellerstein
and Villas-Boas (2010) study the role of foreign outsourcing on the pass-through rate of upstream
part suppliers in the automobile industry. Villas-Boas (2009) studies the e¤ects of a ban on whole-
sale price discrimination on the German co¤ee market. Bonnet, Dubois, Villas-Boas and Klapper
(2013) study the e¤ects of vertical restraints, and in particular of non linear contracts with resale
price maintenance, on the cost pass through of the world market price of co¤ee on retail prices in
Germany. Moreover, the introduction of retailersstrategic behavior has considered mostly cases
where competition between producers and/or retailers remains under linear pricing (like in Sudhir,
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2001, Brenkers and Verboven, 2006). One exception is Villas-Boas (2007) who considers the pos-
sibility that vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers make pricing strategies depart
from double marginalization by setting alternatively wholesale margins or retail margins to zero.
Bonnet and Dubois (2010) extended the analysis modelling explicitly two-part tari¤ contracts with
or without resale price maintenance, but assuming that the buyer power of retailers is exogenously
xed. The consideration of endogenous buyer power within a vertical relationship coming from
horizontal competition at the upstream level has never been taken into account and changes both
qualitatively and quantitatively the nature of equilibria.
Then, more recent work on identication and estimation of bargaining in vertical chains have
been developed with Grennan (2013, 2014), Gowrisankaran, Nevo, Town (2015). Grennan (2013)
makes advantage of the observation of individual transaction prices between stent manufacturers
and hospitals to estimate a structural bargaining model. In their model, manufacturers and hospi-
tals (playing here the role of intermediary between stent producers and patients/doctors) bargain
over the price using bilateral Nash Bargaining à la Horn and Wolinsky (1988) as in Crawford and
Yurukoglu (2012).
Here, we consider a di¤erent contracting framework where upstream rms do not bargain but
make take-it or leave-it o¤ers to downstream rms who however benet from some buyer power
by the ability to refuse o¤ers while accepting others. As in bilateral Nash bargaining, equilibrium
prices will not be uniform and non linear contracts (two part tari¤s) will allow prices to depart
from standard Bertrand Nash equilibrium. Empirical estimation of bargaining models (Grennan,
2013, Gowrisankaran, Nevo, Town (2015)) rely on exogenously given bargaining parameters. Here,
we model the upstream party as having a Stackelberg leader role with take-it or leave-it o¤ers but
allow retailers to benet from their buyer power when facing manufacturers contracts o¤ers. The
buyer power is endogenously determined by the available competing o¤ers of other manufacturers
that can be used as outside options by retailers in addition to the prots obtained from their
private label own brands (store brands).
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We show how we can identify and estimate price-cost margins at the retailer and manufacturer
levels under the di¤erent competition scenarios considered without observing marginal costs and
wholesale prices. Modelling explicitly optimal two-part tari¤ contracts (with or without resale price
maintenance) allows to recover the pricing strategy of manufacturers and retailers. We do not only
recover the total price-cost margins as functions of demand parameters but also the contractual
xed fees and the division of these margins between manufacturers and retailers. Using additional
restrictions on the cost structure allows us to test between the di¤erent models.
We apply our modelling to the bottled water market in France using estimates of a mixed logit
demand model on individual level data. In previous work, Bonnet and Dubois (2010) use the same
market in the late 90s to show how to identify and infer what types of vertical contracts were used
in the retailer chain. This market presents a high degree of concentration both at the manufacturer
and retailer levels. It is to be noted that it is actually even more concentrated at the manufacturer
level with only three large manufacturers than at the retailer level where we have in France seven
large retailing chains. Considering only two part tari¤s contracts with exogenously given outside
options, Bonnet and Dubois (2010) cannot identify all contractual terms of non linear tari¤s but
showed that resale price maintenance was at work in a period where the regulatory rules dening
resale at loss were not including xed rebates, thus facilitating the use of high wholesale prices
in order to impose high retail prices to supermarkets. Here, we present results of identication
of more general two part tari¤s contracts, and show how to obtain unobserved xed fees of two
part tari¤s. In the empirical application, we use more recent data that happen after an important
change in the regulation of manufacturers-retailers contracts, allowing downstream retailers to
potentially exploit their buyer power. Empirical evidence shows that two-part tari¤ contracts
are used without resale price maintenance and that the buyer power of supermarket chains is
endogenously determined by the o¤ers of the multiple manufacturers. Our empirical results can be
related to changes in regulatory rules regarding resale below cost in France that previously led to
resale price maintenance equilibria. We nally obtain empirical estimates of xed fees in addition
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to retail and wholesale margins which allows us to decompose prots sharing in the industry at the
upstream and downstream levels. We nd that some retailers need pay xed fees that represent
roughly between 10 and 25% of their variable prots whereas one retailer chain obtains substantial
backward margins (negative fees).
In section 2, we rst present some stylized facts on the bottled water market in France, an
industry where the questions of vertical relationships and competition of manufacturers and re-
tailers seem worth studying. Section 3 describes the main methodological contribution. We show
how price-cost margins and contracts can be identied once we know the demand shape, using
the observed industry structure and structural assumptions on vertical contracts. In section 4, we
present the demand model, its identication and estimation on individual data as well as empirical
results and tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Bottled Water Market in France
2.1 Stylized Facts
The bottled water market is an important sector of the French food processing industry : 68.2
billion liters were sold in 2006 (Agreste, 2009). This market has not grown in France since then
while it is growing much faster in many other countries including the US and emerging markets
such as Mexico, China. It is also a highly concentrated sector since the three main producers (Nestlé
Waters, Danone, and Castel) share 90% of the total production of the sector in France. Two types
of unavored water coexist, namely, natural mineral water and spring water. The denomination
of "natural mineral" water is o¢ cially recognized by an agreement from the French Ministry of
Health and puts forward properties favorable to health. Composition must be guaranteed as well
as the consistency of a set of qualitative criteria : mineral content, visual aspects, and taste. The
exploitation of a "spring water" source requires a license provided by local authorities and an
agreement of the local health committee but the water composition is not required to be constant.
The di¤erences between the quality requirements involved in the certication of these two kinds of
water may explain part of the large di¤erences that exists between the shelf prices of the mineral
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and spring water brands.
In France, households buy bottled water mostly in supermarkets (80% of total sales) and on
average, these sales represent 1.7% of the total turnover of supermarkets, the bottled water shelf
being one of the most productive. Manufacturers thus deal mainly their brands through retailing
chains which are also highly concentrated on food retailing (the market share of the rst ve
being around 80% of total food retailing). Since the late 90s, food retailing chains have developed
private labels (also called store brands) and the increase in the number of private labels tends to
be accompanied by a reduction of the market shares of the main national brands.
This market is very concentrated and competition concerns are usually put forward. Like in
many countries, regulation of the food retailing industry exhibits strong rules on zoning and entry
of supermarket stores (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002, Jodar-Rosell, 2008) and also restrictions about
vertical contracting between manufacturers and retailers, notably with rules on resale below cost
(Allain and Chambolle, 2011). Consistent with the below cost pricing regulation in France in 1996,
Bonnet and Dubois (2010) showed that the observed pricing could be explained by contracts with
resale price maintenance (RPM) during the period 1998-2000. This evidence is consistent with the
fact that the Galland act (introduced in 1996) prohibited resale at loss by retailers dening the
threshold level of prices from wholesale list prices without including any backward margins (Allain
and Chambolle, 2011). Implementing implicitly RPM was then feasible with this regulation. Such
concern led to the removal of the Galland act by the competition authority with a new law called
"Dutreil II" elaborated in 2005 and e¤ective on January 2006. There is thus a policy interest
in studying competition and pricing relationships after 2006 as such legislation exists or existed
not only in France (Galland Act from 1996 to 2005) but also in other countries like, e.g. Ireland
(Groceries Orders), Spain (Law on Unfair Competition), where the conditional or deferred rebates
that are not written on the invoice are or were excluded from the legal minimum price threshold.
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2.2 Data and Variables
Our data were collected by home-scan technique by the Kantar company and consist of a survey
on householdspurchase. We use a representative sample of French households for the year 2006 for
which we have information on their purchases of all food products. The data provide a description
of the main characteristics of the goods whose purchases are recorded over the whole year at the bar
code level. We thus have quantity, price, brand, date and store of purchase. We use the information
on all bottles of still water purchased. For the purpose of estimation of our structural models, we
will consider the purchases in the seven most important retailers which represent 70.9% of the total
purchases of the sample. We take into account the most important brands, that is : ve national
brands of mineral water, one national brand of spring water, one retailer private label brand of
mineral water and one retailer private label spring water. The purchases of these eight brands
represent 69.3% of the purchases of the seven retailers. The national brands are produced by three
di¤erent manufacturers : Danone, Nestlé Waters and Castel.
These eight brands sold in seven retailer chains give 56 di¤erentiated products. For each of these
products, we compute an average price for each month using all observed purchases by households
during the month. Table 1 presents some rst descriptive statistics on some of the main variables
used.
Table 1 : Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max
Price in e/liter 0.251 0.213 0.127 0.113 0.929
Price in e/liter : Mineral Water 0.369 0.359 0.034 0.200 0.929
Price in e/liter : Spring Water 0.148 0.134 0.034 0.113 0.313
Mineral water dummy (0/1) 0.66 1 0.47 0 1
3 Identifying Margins and Contract Relationships Between
Manufacturers and Retailers
We now turn to the modelling of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers and
study the conditions of identication of price cost margins and contracts. We introduce an oligopoly
8
model with vertical relationships. We consider the benchmark cases of linear pricing and two part
tari¤s contracts with exogenously given outside options (as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010)), and
then show new results on the modelling and identication of margins and contracts when retailers
benet from some endogenous buyer power when facing manufacturerstwo part tari¤s o¤ers. In
this section, we develop the identication results assuming that the demand function is known
as well as retail prices for a set of T markets since we know that we can identify the demand
independently of any assumption on the supply side as we will remind in section 4 .
Lets introduce the model considering R retailers and F multi-brand manufacturers. We denote
J the number of di¤erentiated products dened by the brand-retailer pair among which J 0 products
are manufacturer branded products and J   J 0 are store brands (also called private labels). We
denote Sr the set of products sold by retailer r and Gf the set of products produced by rm f .
3.1 Benchmark case of Linear Pricing
Lets consider the case where manufacturers set wholesale prices rst, and retailers follow by
setting the retail prices. We obtain the usual double marginalization result. For private labels,
prices are chosen by the retailer who bears both retailing and production costs. Using backward
induction, the retailers problem consists in maximizing its prot denoted r for retailer r and
equal to
r =
X
j2Sr
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)
where pj is the retail price of product j, wj is the wholesale price of product j, cj is the retailers
(constant) marginal cost of distribution for product j, sj(p) is the market share of product j, p is
the vector of retail prices of all products.
Remark that we normalized the prot by the market size but will re-scale them at the country
level when needed. Since we will take into account an outside good option denoted good 0, this
normalization is equivalent as if we had used the total demand of each good instead of market
shares.
Assuming that a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists, prices must satisfy
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the system of equations given by rst-order conditions
sj +
X
k2Sr
(pk   wk   ck)@sk
@pj
= 0; (1)
for all j 2 Sr and all r = 1; ::; R.
This system of equations allows to identify all retail margins as function of the demand and of
observed equilibrium prices. As using vector notations will prove useful, we dene Ir as the (J  J)
diagonal matrix whose (j; j) element is 1 if j 2 Sr and zero otherwise. Let Sp be the matrix of
partial derivatives of all market shares with respect to all retail prices, i.e.
Sp(p) 
0BB@
@s1(p)
@p1
: : : @sJ (p)@p1
...
...
@s1(p)
@pJ
: : : @sJ (p)@pJ
1CCA
Denoting the vector of retail margins   p w   c, the rst order conditions (1) imply that for
all r1
Ir =   (IrSp(p)Ir) 1 Irs(p) (2)
where we obtain  using  =
PR
r=1 Ir because the left multiplication by Ir amounts to replace
rows that does not correspond to products of retailer r by zeros. Remark that for private labels,
this price-cost margin is in fact the total price-cost margin which amounts to replace the wholesale
price w by the marginal cost of production  in this formula.
Concerning the manufacturersbehavior, we assume they maximize prot choosing the whole-
sale prices wj of their own products and given the retailersresponse (1). The prot of manufacturer
f is given by
f =
X
j2Gf
(wj   j)sj(p(w))
where j is the manufacturers (constant) marginal cost of production of product j. Assuming the
existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices between manufacturers,
1Abusing notations, we consider the generalized inverse when noting the inverse of non invertible matrices, which
means that for example

2 0
0 0
 1
=

1=2 0
0 0

.
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the rst order conditions are
sj +
X
k2Gf
X
l=1;::;J
(wk   k)
@sk
@pl
@pl
@wj
= 0, (3)
for all j 2 Gf and all f = 1; ::; F .
This system of equations allows to identify all wholesale margins as function of the demand
function, equilibrium prices and retail price reactions to wholesale prices that are also identied
by totally di¤erentiating (1).
It is again convenient to use matrix notation, with If the diagonal matrix and whose (j; j)
element is one if j 2 Gf and zero otherwise and Pw the J  J matrix of partial derivatives of the
J retail prices with respect to the J 0 wholesale prices. Remark that the last J   J 0 rows of this
matrix are zero because they correspond to private label products.
Pw(w) 
0BBBB@
@p1(w)
@w1
:: @pJ (w)@w1
...
...
@p1(w)
@wJ0
:: @pJ (w)@wJ0
0 :: 0
1CCCCA
Denoting the vector of manufacturers margins    w   , the rst order conditions (3) imply
that for all f = 1; ::; F :
If  =  (IfPw(w)Sp(p)If ) 1Ifs(p) (4)
Assuming that retailers follow manufacturers in setting the retail prices given the wholesale
prices, Pw(w) can be deduced from the di¤erentiation of the retailers rst order conditions (1)
with respect to wholesale price, i.e. for j 2 Sr and k = 1; ::; J 0 (omitting arguments) :
X
l=1;::;J
@sj
@pl
@pl
@wk
  1fk2Srg
@sk
@pj
+
X
l2Sr
@sl
@pj
@pl
@wk
+
X
l2Sr
(pl   wl   cl)
X
m=1;::;J
@2sl
@pj@pm
@pm
@wk
= 0 (5)
where 1fk2Srg = 1 if k 2 Sr and 0 otherwise. Dening Spjp the matrix of the second partial
derivatives of market shares with respect to pj and all prices :
Spjp 
0BB@
@2s1
@p1@pj
: : : @
2sJ
@p1@pj
... :
...
@2s1
@pJ@pj
: : : @
2sJ
@pJ@pj
1CCA ,
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we can solve the system of equations (5) to obtain Pw=
PR
r=1 IrPw with
2 :
IrPw = (Ir   eIr)S0pIr SpIr + IrS0pIr + (Sp1p Irj:::jSpJp Ir)Ir 1 (6)
where eIr is the diagonal matrix where element (j; j) is one if j is a private label of retailer r and
zero otherwise (Ir   eIr is thus the ownership matrix of national brands by retailer r).
Thus, one can express the manufacturers price-cost margins vector   = w    as depending
on the demand shape and equilibrium prices using (6) to solve for Pw in (4). As already known,
with linear pricing between manufacturers and retailers, both manufacturer level and retailer level
price-cost margins are identied with (2) and (4).
3.2 Two-Part Tari¤s Contracts with Retail Buyer Power
We now consider the case where manufacturers and retailers can sign two-part tari¤ contracts.
We assume that manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to retailers and characterize symme-
tric subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Rey and Vergé (2010) have proven the existence of equilibria
of this multiple common agency game. Two part tari¤s contracts consist in the specication of
franchise fees and wholesale prices and can include retail prices in the case where manufacturers
use resale price maintenance (RPM). All o¤ers are public3 and retailers simultaneously accept or
reject. Contrary to Bonnet and Dubois (2010), where it is assumed that if one o¤er is rejected then
all contracts are refused and retailers obtain a xed reservation utility, we allow the possibility that
a retailer rejects a contract while accepting others. Once o¤ers have been accepted, the retailers
simultaneously set their retail prices, demands and contracts are satised.
As two-part tari¤ contracts are negotiated at the rm level and not by brand, multi-brand
manufacturers make bundling o¤ers to retailers. Retailers can then refuse a manufacturers o¤er
and accept those of other manufacturers. Remark that these multi-brand bundling contracts imply
that a retailer cannot refuse part of the brands o¤ered by a manufacturer while accepting others
2We use the notation (ajb) for horizontal concatenation of a and b. The full matrix Pw can be obtained by
summing over r these expressions.
3This is a convenient benchmark case that can be justied in France by the nondiscrimination laws of the 1986
edict of free pricing which prevents the o¤er of di¤erent wholesale prices to purchasers who provide comparable
services.
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owned by this same manufacturer. The more products are owned by a manufacturer, the larger
will be his market power and the lower the buyer power of retailers.
The prot function of retailer r now writes :
r =
X
j2Sr
[(pj   wj   cj)sk(p)  Fj ] (7)
where Fj is the franchise fee paid by the retailer r for selling product j 2 Sr (Fj can be negative
if backward margins are received by the retailer). The prot function of rm f is equal to
f =
X
j2Gf
[(wj   j)sj(p) + Fj ]. (8)
Contract o¤ers are simultaneous but the incentive constraints of the retailers are such that contracts
o¤ered by a manufacturer to a retailer must provide to the retailer a prot at least as large as the
prot that the retailer would obtain when refusing the proposed contract but accepting all other
o¤ers. In addition to these incentive compatibility conditions, retailersprots must be at least
larger than some xed reservation prot level denoted 
r
for retailer r (that could be normalized
to zero or to some xed exogenous opening operation cost).
Thus, manufacturers set the two-part tari¤ contracts (wholesale prices and xed fees) in order
to maximize prots as in (8) subject, for all r = 1; ::; R, to the following retailersparticipation
constraints
r  r, (9)
and incentive constraints
r 
X
j2SrnGfr
[(epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)  Fj ] (10)
where r is the retailers prot (7) when accepting all o¤ers, Gfr is the set of products owned by
rm f and distributed by retailer r, and epfr = (epfr1 ; ::; epfrJ ) is the vector of retail prices when the
products in Gfr are not sold (by convention we will have epfri = +1 if i 2 Gfr) because r refused
the o¤er of f .
When the retailer r refuses the o¤er of the manufacturer f but accepts all other o¤ers, retailer
r sell all products not manufactured by f , whose set is denoted SrnGfr. The market share sj(epfr)
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of each product of the set SrnGfr corresponds to the market share of product j when all products
in Gfr are absent.
As constraint (10) imply an upper bound on total xed fees obtained by each manufacturer
from each retailer :
X
j2Gfr
Fs 
X
j2Sr
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)i ; (11)
following Rey and Vergé (2010) arguments, given a vector of wholesale prices, each manufacturer
can always increase the xed fees such that the constraint (11) will be binding provided the values
of 
r
are not too large.
Actually, constraints (10) imply that
r =
X
j2Sr
[(pj   wj   cj)sk(p)] 
X
f=1;::F
X
j2Gfr
Fj

X
j2Sr
[(pj   wj   cj)sk(p)] 
X
f=1;::F
X
j2Sr
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)i
and the participation constraints (9) will be satised when 
r
is lower than the right hand side of
the above equation. As this right hand side variable could be made very low and even negative by
decreasing wholesale prices, participation constraints (9) may become binding while (10) remains
a strict inequality.
In the following, we consider both cases where either (9) or (10) bind. If constraints (10) are
binding, the sum of xed fees paid for the products of f sold through r is
X
j2Gfr
Fs =
X
j2Sr
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)i (12)
because sj(epfr) = 0 when j 2 Gfr. Remark that this is not necessarily positive as it will depend
on the way retail prices are set in case of disagreement between f and r.
Using this expression, one can then rewrite the prot of the manufacturer f as
f =
X
j2Gf
[(wj   j)sj(p) + Fj ] =
X
j2Gf
(wj   j)sj(p) +
XR
r=1
X
j2Gfr
Fj
=
X
j2Gf
(wj   j)sj(p) +
XR
r=1
X
j2Sr
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)i
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because [Rr=1Gfr = Gf (and Gfr \Gfr0 = ?). The manufacturers prot is then
f =
X
j2Gf
(wj   j)sj(p) +
JX
j=1
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfr(j)j   wj   cj)sj(epfr(j))i (13)
=
X
j2Gf
(pj   j   cj)sj(p) +
X
j =2Gf
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfr(j)j   wj   cj)sj(epfr(j))i
where r(j) denotes the retailer of product j.
We will also consider a simpler case where constraints (10) are never binding which amounts
to not consider those incentive constraints as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). Then, the outside
opportunities depend on a xed exogenous reservation prot and the buyer power of retailer is
exogenously determined. This could happen if outside options of retailers are strong and indepen-
dently determined (for example by the opportunity value of saved space in supermarkets). Then,
as shown in Bonnet and Dubois (2010), the manufacturers prot becomes
f =
X
j2Gf
(pj   j   cj)sj(p) +
X
j 62Gf
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) 
X
j 62Gf
Fj  
X
r=1;:;R

r
and the maximization is equivalent to set wholesale prices in the following program
max
fwjgj2Gf
X
j2Gf
(pj   j   cj)sj(p) +
X
j 62Gf
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) (14)
instead of maximizing (13).
We now consider two possibilities regarding two part tari¤s contracts. We rst consider that
manufacturers are not using resale price maintenance (RPM) in their contracts but set wholesale
prices and retailers set retail prices. Then, as it may be a dominant strategy to use RPM, even if
its against the law, we also consider the case where RPM may be used.
3.2.1 Without Resale Price Maintenance
We rst consider the case where manufacturers cannot use resale price maintenance (RPM) in
their contracts. In this case, the mappings epfr(w) from wholesale prices to retail prices are out
of equilibrium prices and correspond to the retail prices when r refuses the o¤er of f but accepts
all others. Given the retail price equilibrium mappings p(w) and the out of equilibrium mappings
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epfr(w) for all f and r, the rst order conditions of the maximization of the prot of f (13) with
respect to wholesale prices wj , can be written for all j 2 Gf :
0 =
JX
i=1
X
k2Gf
(wk   k)
@sk(p)
@pi
@pi
@wj
+
JX
k=1
"
@pk
@wj
sk(p)  @epfr(k)k
@wj
sk(epfr(k))#
+
JX
i=1
JX
k=1

(pk   wk   ck) @sk(p)
@pi
@pi
@wj
 
epfr(k)k   wk   ck @sk(epfr(k))@pi @pi@wj

where r(k) denotes the retailer index of product k.
In matrix notation, omitting unnecessary arguments, the previous rst order conditions give
0 = IfPwSpIf  + IfPws(p)  If ~P fws(epf ) + IfPwSp   IfPwSfep ef
where the matrix Sfep is
Sfep 
0BB@
@s1(epfr(1))
@p1
:: @sJ (epfr(J))@p1
...
...
@s1(epfr(1))
@pJ
:: @sJ (epfr(J))@pJ
1CCA
and ~P fw is the matrix of partial derivatives of retail prices epfr(j)j (w) (for j = 1; ::; J) with respect
to wholesale prices w.
Thus the wholesale margins of products of manufacturer f are
If  =   [IfPwSpIf ] 1

IfPws(p)  If ~P fws(epf ) + IfPwSp   IfPwSfep ef (15)
where  comes from (2) and ef  (ef1 ; ::; efJ) where efj is the jth row element of vector (Ir(j)Sfep Ir(j)) 1Ir(j)s(epf ).
Remark that out of equilibrium retail prices can be obtained from observed equilibrium retail
prices, retail margins at equilibrium and out of equilibrium retail margins using : epfr(j)j = efr(j)j  
(pj   wj   cj)+pj where efr(j)j = epfr(j)j  wj cj is the out of equilibrium retail margin. Moreover,
~P fw can be deduced from the di¤erentiation of the retailers rst order conditions with respect to
wholesale prices. These rst order conditions are, for all r = 1; ::; R and all j 2 Sr,
sj(epfr) + X
k2SrnGfr
(epfrk   wk   ck)@sk(epfr)
@~pfrj
= 0
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which gives for r = 1; ::; R, j 2 Sr and k = 1; ::; J 0
0 =
X
l2f1;::;JgnGfr
@sj(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)l
@epfr(j)l
@wk
  1fk2Srg
@sk(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j +
X
l2Sr
@sl(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j
@epfr(j)l
@wk
+
X
l2SrnGfr
24(epfrl   wl   cl) X
m2f1;::;JgnGfr
@2sl(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)m
@epfr(j)m
@wk
35 (16)
Dening Spj
~pf
the JJ matrix of the second partial derivatives of the market shares whose element
(s; l) is @
2sl(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)k , i.e.
S
pj
~pf

0BBBB@
@2s1(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)1 : : : @
2sJ (epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)1
... :
...
@2s1(epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)J : : : @
2sJ (epfr(j))
@epfr(j)j @epfr(j)J
1CCCCA ;
we can write equation (16) to obtain
~P fw
h
Sfep + IrSf 0ep + (Sp1~pf Irefrj:::jSpJ~pf Irefr)i Ir   IrSfep Ir   eIr = 0
where efr = epfr  w   c.
Dening Mfr 
h
Sfep + IrSf 0ep + (Sp1~pf Irefrj:::jSpJ~pf Irefr)i we can solve this system of equations
and get the following expression for ~P fw
~P fw =  
XR
r=1
IrM
0
frIrS
fep (Ir   eIr)XRr=1 IrM 0frMfrIr
 1
Equation (15) shows that one can express the manufacturers price-cost margins as depending
on the demand function and the structure of the industry by replacing the expression of ~P fw. We
thus obtain that both the manufacturer level and retailer level margins are identied using (2) and
(15) to obtain respectively If and If  for all f = 1; ::; F .
In the case where the retailersbuyer power is exogenously because constraints (10) are irre-
levant and only constraints (9) have to be taken into account, the rst order conditions are of
maximization of (14) are : for all i 2 Gf ,
X
k
@pk
@wi
sk(p) +
X
k2Gf
24(pk   k   ck)X
j
@sk
@pj
@pj
@wi
35+ X
k 62Gf
24(pk   wk   ck)X
j
@sk
@pj
@pj
@wi
35 = 0
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which gives in matrix notation
IfPws(p) + IfPwSpIf (p    c) + IfPwSp (I   If ) (p w   c) = 0
This implies that the total price-cost margin is such that for all f = 1; ::; F;
If ( +  ) = (IfPwSpIf )
 1
[ IfPws(p)  IfPwSp (I   If ) (p w   c)] : (17)
Using (2) to replace (p  w   c) and (6) for Pw, this allows us to identify all price-cost margins.
Remark again that the formula (2) provides directly the total price-cost margin obtained by each
retailer on its private label.
Then, in the case where the incentive constraints (12) are binding, we can identify total xed
fees
P
j2Gfr Fj paid by any retailer r to any manufacturer f usingX
j2Gfr
Fs =
X
j2Sr
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)i
because rst order conditions determine retail margins (ps   ws   cs) at equilibrium, and out
of equilibrium retail margins (epfrj   wj   cj) in case r refuses the o¤er of f .
Remark that when participation constraints are binding, we cannot identify xed fees that
depend on exogenously xed reservation prots 
r
.
3.2.2 With Resale Price Maintenance
Lets consider the case where manufacturers use resale price maintenance (RPM) in their
contracts with retailers. Then, manufacturers can choose retail prices while the wholesale prices
have no direct e¤ect on prot. In this case, the vectors of prices epfr are such that epfri = pi if
i =2 Gfr and the prot (13) of manufacturer f can then be written as4
f =
X
j2Gf
(wj   j)sj(p) +
XJ
j=1
(pj   wj   cj)
h
sj(p)  sj(epfr(j))i
Remark that with RPM, the previous expression of the manufacturer prot can be written
f =
X
j2Gf
((pj   j   cj)sj(p) +
X
j =2Gf
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) 
JX
j=1
(pj   wj   cj)sj(epfr(j))
4Because also ss(epfr(s)) = 0; epfrs = +1 for s 2 Gfr and by convention ss(epfr(s))epfrs = 0.
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where the part
P
j2Gf
(pj   j   cj)sj(p) +
P
j =2Gf
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) is the expression of the prot
when there is no incentive constraint and thus the buyer power corresponds to the rent
PJ
j=1(pj  
wj   cj)sj(epfr(j)) = P
j =2Gf
(pj   wj   cj)sj(epfr(j)) (because sj(epfr(j)) = 0 if j 2 Gf ) that the
manufacturer has to leave to the retailer. With RPM, we see that this "endogenous" rent that the
manufacturer f has to leave to the retailer r (
P
j =2Gf
(pj   wj   cj)sj(epfr(j))) is not a¤ected by the
retail prices on its own products decided using RPM because the vector epfr(j) corresponds to the
vector of prices when rm f products are not sold by retailer r and thus is not a¤ected by retail
prices of rm f products but only by competing manufacturers choices of prices.
Now, we can use the rst order conditions of the maximization of prot of f with respect to
retail prices pj 2 Gf which are :
0 = sj(p) +
JX
k=1

(pk   wk   ck)@sk(p)
@pj

+
X
k2Gf
(wk   k)
@sk(p)
@pj
As Rey and Vergé (2010) argue, a continuum of equilibria exist in this general case with RPM,
with one equilibrium corresponding to each possible value of the vector of wholesale prices w.
As we can re-write the retail margins (p   w   c) as the di¤erence between total margins
(p      c) and wholesale margins (w   ), the previous J   J 0 rst order conditions can be
written in a matrix form as
Ifs(p) + IfSp(p)( +  )  IfSp(p)(I   If )  = 0 (18)
where   =
 
wj   j

j=1;::;J
is the full vector of wholesale margins and  +   the vector of total
margins.
The previous equations stand for the pricing of brands owned by manufacturers who retail their
products through a downstream intermediary. Private labels (store brands) pricing obviously does
not follow the same pricing equilibrium. However the retailersprots coming from private labels
are implicitly taken into account in the incentive and participation constraints of retailers when
manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Taking into account the possibility of endogenous
entry and exit of private label products by retailers is out of the scope of this paper.
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Thus, in the case of private label or store brand products, retailers choose retail prices and bear
the marginal cost of production and distribution, solving :
max
fpjgj2 eSr
X
j2eSr (pj   j   cj)sj(p) +
X
j2SrneSr (pj   wj   cj)sj(p)
where eSr is the set of private label products of retailer r. The rst order conditions of the prot
maximization of retailers give
X
k2eSr
(pk   k   ck)
@sk(p)
@pj
+ sj(p) +
X
k2SrneSr
(pk   wk   ck)@sk(p)
@pj
= 0 for all j 2 eSr
which can be written
X
k2Sr
(pk   k   ck)
@sk(p)
@pj
+ sj(p) 
X
k2SrneSr
(wk   k)
@sk(p)
@pj
= 0 for all j 2 eSr
These conditions clearly show that wholesale prices on manufacturer brands also a¤ect the pricing
conditions of store brands.
In matrix notation, these rst order conditions are : for r = 1; ::; R
eIrs(p) + (eIrSp(p)Ir)( +  )  eIrSp(p)Ir  = 0 (19)
where eIr is the ownership matrix of private label products by retailer r.
We thus obtain the following system of equations with (18) and (19) where  and   are
unknown : 
Ifs(p) + IfSp(p)( +  )  IfSp(p)(I   If )  = 0 for f = 1; ::; FeIrs(p) + (eIrSp(p)Ir)( +  )  eIrSp(p)Ir  = 0 for r = 1; ::; R
After solving the system (see appendix 6.3), we obtain the expression for the total price-cost margin
of all products as a function of demand parameters, of the structure of the industry and the vector
  of wholesale margins :
 +   =  
X
r
IrS
0
p(p)eIrSp(p)Ir +X
f
S0p(p)IfSp(p)
 1
X
r
IrS
0
p(p)eIr [s(p)  Sp(p)Ir ] +X
f
S0p(p)If [s(p)  Sp(p)(I   If ) ]

(20)
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Thus, there is a continuum of equilibria depending on the vector of wholesale prices w which
prevents the full identication of price-cost margins without further restriction. In the absence of
store brands, this would simplify to
 +   =  
X
f
S0p(p)IfSp(p)
 1 X
f
S0p(p)If [s(p)  Sp(p)(I   If ) ]

Contrary to the previous case without RPM, identication then requires additional restric-
tions. Actually, with J products and T markets, we have JT marginal costs of distribution and JT
marginal costs of production that are unknown, or equivalently JT retailer margins and JT ma-
nufacturer margins. Thus, 2JT parameters have to be identied while our structural model gives
a system of JT equations. Then, identication cannot be obtained unless additional restrictions
are imposed.
We consider several possible restrictions, from very strong ones imposing zero wholesale or
retail margins to a general case with a less restrictive one.
Zero wholesale margins : Fixing the vector of wholesale margins  t to zero is su¢ cient to get
identication of total margins and thus also retail and wholesale margins which are zero in this
case. This corresponds to the particular equilibrium where wholesale prices are such that wjt = jt
for all j, t that is  t = 0, 8t. Simplifying (20), it implies that
t =  
X
r
IrS
0
p
eIrSpIr +X
f
S0pIfSp
 1 X
r
IrS
0
p
eIr +X
f
S0pIf

s(pt) (21)
Remark that in the absence of private label products, this expression would simplify to the case
where the total prots of the whole industry are maximized, that is
t =  S 1p s(pt) (22)
because then
P
f If = I and eIr = 0.
This shows that two part tari¤s contracts with RPM allow to maximize the full prots of the
integrated industry if retailers have no private label products, the buyer power of retailers shifting
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simply the rent between parties5 .
Zero retail margins : When wholesale prices are such that the retailers price-cost margins are
zero (pjt(w

jt)   wjt   cjt = 0 that is ft = 0 for all f), then the rst order conditions give the
simplied expression of wholesale margins as
 ft = (pt   t   ct) =  (IfSpIf ) 1Ifs(pt) (23)
for all f = 1; ::; F . For private label products, denoting plrt +  
pl
rt the vector of total price-cost
margins of private labels of retailer r, we have
plrt +  
pl
rt =  (eIrSp eIr) 1 eIrs(pt)
All margins are then identied.
General case : A less restrictive identication method may consist in adding restrictions on the
vectors of marginal costs or margins. Actually, (20) denes a known mapping H(:) between the
vector of total margins ( t + t) and wholesale margins ( t) for market t, as
( t + t) = H( t)
where H(:) depends only on the demand shape and the structure of the industry.
Thus, there exists a one to one correspondence between the vector of unknown JT parameters
 jt and the vector of unknown JT total marginal costs denoted Cjt because
Cjt  jt + cjt = pjt  
 
 jt + jt

= pjt  Hj( t) for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T
where Hj denotes the jth row of H.
Then, adding some cost function restrictions, we can get identication of retail and wholesale
margins in two-part tari¤s models with RPM. Of course these additional identifying restrictions
5Rey and Vergé (2010) showed that, among the continuum of possible equilibria, the case where wholesale prices
are equal to the marginal costs of production is the equilibrium that would be selected if retailers can provide a
retailing e¤ort that increases demand. In this case, if the manufacturer allows the retailer to be the residual claimant
of his retailing e¤ort, it leads to select wholesale prices equal to marginal costs of production.
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are not without loss of generality but it happens that some natural restrictions appear in the case
of di¤erentiated products models. We thus consider the following assumption :
Identication assumption : there is a set of observed variables Zjt and a known function
f(:; ) with nite dimensional parameter  2  such that for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T
Cjt = f(Zjt; ) + jt with E
 
jtjZjt

= 0 (24)
Then, we can use this assumption to identify the set of parameters ( ; ) that satisfy the
moment condition
E
 
jt ( ; )

= 0 (25)
where
jt ( ; ) = pjt  Hj( t)  f(Zjt; )
As rjt ( ; ) =  rf(Zjt; ) and r jt ( ; ) =  r Hj( t) where Hj( t) is given by (20)
we know that we will get identication depending on the cost restrictions and on Hj(:) (the jth
row of H which depends on the demand shape) if the Jacobian matrix of E

jt ( ; )

, that is
E
r jt ( ; ) ;rjt ( ; ), has full rank. This condition depends on the shape of the demand
and the structure of the industry. Actually, the gradient r Hj( ) can be written (using Ij for the
matrix that is zero everywhere except equal to one on the (j; j) element)
r Hj( ) = Ij
X
r
IrS
0
p(p)
eIrSp(p)Ir +X
f
S0p(p)IfSp(p)
 1
X
r
IrS
0
p(p)
eIr [Sp(p)Ir] +X
f
S0p(p)If [Sp(p)(I   If )]

which in general has no reason to be colinear with rf(Zjt; ). It is however enlightening to look
at specic cases.
If we dont have store brands, we can simplify the above expression to
r Hj( ) = Ij
X
f
S0p(p)IfSp(p)
 1 X
f
S0p(p)If [Sp(p)(I   If )]

which has also no reason to be colinear with rf(Zjt; ). In the case where we have a manufacturer
in monopoly situation, then ( +  ) =  Sp(p) 1s(p) and r  ( +  ) = 0 (because If = I) In
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which case, unsurprisingly, wholesale margins have no impact on total margins (and prices) since
the manufacturer uses two part tari¤s contracts to capture all the retailers rents and wholesale
prices have no impact on the equilibrium.
Then, we can also remark that the restriction on the function f(:; ) can imply a restriction on
margins if for example Zjt = ( ~Zjt; pjt) and we impose for some g(:; ) that f(Zjt; ) = g( ~Zjt; )pjt.
Finally, remark that some "natural" restrictions on the cost function arise from the additive
structure of total marginal cost between marginal cost of production and distribution. For example,
one could consider that the marginal cost of production jt should depend only on the brand of
product j, meaning that the same brand sold in two di¤erent retailers should have the same
marginal cost of production. One could also consider that the marginal cost of distribution cjt for
product j should depend only on the retailer identity and not on the brand. Thus without even
adding restrictions across markets but simply restrictions across di¤erentiated products it would
be natural to impose that Cjt = jt + cjt = b(j)t + cr(j)t where b(j) denotes the brand index of
product j and r(j) denotes the retailer index of product j. Such restriction would reduce the degree
of underidentication of margins since it adds J = B  R restrictions and only B + R additional
unknown parameters. The true degree of underidentication will depend on the properties of the
non linear function H(:).
Then, once margins have been identied, one can identify the sum of xed fees paid by any
retailer to any manufacturer using the fact that with RPM
X
j2Gfr
Fs =
X
j2Sr
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) 
X
j2SrnGfr
(pj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)
=
X
j2Gfr
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p) +
X
j2SrnGfr
(pj   wj   cj)

sj(p)  sj(epfr)
where epfrj = pj for j 2 SrnGfr since RPM is used by all manufacturers which implies that retail
prices will not depend on the fact that some retailer has refused some manufacturers o¤er, but
sj(p) 6= sj(epfr) if j 2 SrnGfr because of substitutions in demand to other products when products
Gfr are not in shelves (because refusal by retailer r of rm f products), and because by convention
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sj(epfr) = 0 for j 2 Gfr.
Finally, when participation constraints are binding, one cannot identify xed fees because
X
j2Sr
Fj =
X
j2Sr
[(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)] r
where 
r
is unknown. In this case, only "variable" margins and marginal costs can possibly be
identied. Prots of retailers and manufacturers are identied up to a constant which is exogenous
to the horizontal and vertical competition game.
4 Econometric Estimation and Empirical Results
We now turn to the empirical estimation and tests by rst showing how we identify the demand
independently from any assumption on the supply side (using individual consumer data but that
we could have done it with aggregate data as in Nevo (2001)). We then present the estimation and
tests of the supply side models and contracts using the demand estimates.
4.1 A Random Coe¢ cients Logit Demand Model
We use a standard discrete choice model of consumer behavior following Berry (1994), Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and estimate this random coe¢ cient logit model on individual choices
as in Revelt and Train (1998). It is well known that random coe¢ cients logit models are very
exible (McFadden and Train, 2000) and are not as restrictive on own and cross-price elasticities
as a simple logit model thanks to the allowing of heterogeneity of preferences on individual purchase
choices. Thus, we assume that the indirect utility function of a consumer i buying product j at t
is
Uijt = b(j) + r(j) + iXj   ipjt + ijt (26)
where b(j) represents a brand time invariant specic e¤ect on utility, r(j) represents a retailer
time invariant specic e¤ect, Xj is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the product j is a
mineral water and 0 otherwise (some brands have both versions which allows identication of the
mean e¤ect of i in addition to its variance), pjt is the price of product j at period t, and ijt is
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an additive separable deviation from the mean utility. The random coe¢ cient i represents the
unobserved marginal disutility of income for consumer i. We assume that i =  + vi where
vi is distributed standard normal and 
 characterizes how consumer marginal utility of income
deviates from the mean. We also assume that consumers have di¤erent tastes i for the mineral
water versus spring water characteristic. Hence, we write i =  + vi where v

i is distributed
standard normal.
The model is completed by the inclusion of an outside good, denoted good zero, allowing
consumer i not to buy one of the J marketed products during period t. The mean utility of the
outside good is normalized to zero implying that the consumer indirect utility of choosing the
outside good is Ui0t = i0t.
As some product characteristics might be omitted in the specication of utility (26), like for
instance, product advertising, and be correlated with prices, we follow Petrin and Train (2010)
which proposes a control function approach to solve this endogeneity problem of prices. This
method consists in estimating a rst stage regression of prices on observed cost shifters as follows :
pjt = b(j) + r(j) + Xj + Wjt + jt
where b(j) and r(j) are respectively brand and retailer specic e¤ects, Wjt represents a vector of
observed possible cost shifters (like input prices or product characteristics), Xj some observed time
invariant product characteristics and jt is a random shock dened as the residual of the orthogonal
projection of pjt on b(j), r(j), Wjt. Then, introducing jt in the specication of the consumer
utility Uijt makes the assumption of orthogonality of the residual consumer utility deviations with
price more plausible. This method amounts to assume that the consumer utility can be written as
follows :
Uijt = b(j) + r(j) + iXj   ipjt + jt + "ijt
where by denition ijt = jt + "ijt with the assumption that "ijt is orthogonal to pjt. With this
random utility, we assume that consumer i chooses alternative j if Uijt  Uijt for all j = 1; ::; J
and Uijt > Uijt for some j.
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This method allows to estimate consistently the demand price elasticities even if time varying
unobserved characteristics (correlated with jt) a¤ect consumer tastes and are correlated with
price (like advertising), provided that the residual or the projection of these unobservables on jt
be uncorrelated with the price pjt.
Then, we assume that the idiosyncratic taste shocks "ijt are independently and identically
distributed according to a Gumbel (extreme value type 1) distribution, so that the consumer i
choice probability Lijt of buying j at period t conditional on i, i and  is :
Lijt(i; i;) =
exp(Vijt)
1 +
PJ
k=1 exp(Vikt)
where Vijt = b(j) + r(j) + iXj   ipjt + jt.
Then, the unconditional probability of the observed sequence of T choices for consumer i is
Pi(; 
; ; ;) =
Z YT
t=1
Lij(i;t)t(i; i;)

f(ij; )f(ij; )didi
where  is the vector of all b, r and  parameters in (26), j
(i; t) is the chosen alternative by
consumer i at period t and f(ij; ) and f(ij; ) are the p.d.f. of the random coe¢ cients i
and i respectively assumed independent.
We use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the model parameters (Train, 2009), maxi-
mizing
SLL(; ; ; ;) =
XN
i=1
ln

1
R
XR
r=1
YT
t=1
Lij(i;t)t(
r; r;)

with respect to ; ; ; ; and where R is the number of simulations, r and r are the rth
Halton draws of the distributions f(ij; ) and f(ij; ) respectively.
The random coe¢ cients logit model generates a exible pattern of substitutions between pro-
ducts. Consumers have di¤erent price disutilities that will be averaged to a mean price sensitivity
and cross-price elasticities are not constrained by the individual level logit assumption. Once the
demand parameters have been estimated, the aggregate market shares and price elasticities of the
demand can be obtained by simulation and used for the estimation of price-cost margins using the
di¤erent supply models presented in section 3.
27
4.2 Demand Estimation Results
Using the data described in section 2.2, we have constructed observations of the households
choices of bottles of water over 13 periods of 4 weeks in 2006 using each purchase. In case of
multiple purchases within a period, we randomly draw a product purchased during each period.
Doing such aggregation is however not essential for the results found. The household purchase data
nally allows to construct a sample of 2,836 households present over the whole 13 periods that
is 36,868 observations. We have removed households not present in the survey for more than 6
months in 2006 and also removed observations for which missing values exist in some variables.
The demand estimation results of the random coe¢ cient logit as well as a simple multinomial logit
are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 : Estimation Results of Demand Models6
Multinomial Random Coe¢ cients
Logit Logit
Coe¢ cients (1) (2)
Price ( ) -18.76 (0.421) -20.33 (0.427)
Price () 6.42 (0.1665)
Mineral water () 1.28 (0.087) 3.48 (0.1174)
Mineral water () 3.83 (0.1041)
Control bjt () 17.06 (0.474) 15.85 (0.5222)
Brand 1 3.01 (0.089) 3.20 (0.1054)
Brand 2 5.08 (0.125) 5.48 (0.1316)
Brand 3 1.86 (0.083) 1.99 (0.0949)
Brand 4 0.97 (0.068) 1.28 (0.0744)
Brand 5 2.25 (0.072) 2.81 (0.0728)
Brand 6 0.88 (0.052) 0.69 (0.0507)
Retailer 1 0.15 (0.072) 0.36 (0.0637)
Retailer 2 0.69 (0.074) 0.92 (0.0626)
Retailer 3 0.02 (0.078) 0.25 (0.0742)
Retailer 4 0.45 (0.071) 0.62 (0.0730)
Retailer 5 0.90 (0.068) 0.11 (0.0635)
Retailer 6 -0.17 (0.092) 0.03 (0.0824)
Notes : Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis (100 replications).
The results show that the price coe¢ cient has the expected sign. In the case of the random
coe¢ cient logit model, the price coe¢ cient has a normal distribution with mean equal to -20.33
and standard deviation  equal to 6.42 which means that only 0.07% of the distribution of
6Remark that we cannot provide the names of brand and retailer chains using these Kantar proprietary data.
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the coe¢ cient i has the wrong sign. The mean taste of the mineral characteristic is positive
which means that consumers like mineral waters. Only 17.6% do not like it. In the multinomial
or random coe¢ cient logit model, the parameter  of the control term jt (obtained from a rst
stage price regression shown in Appendix 6.2) is signicantly positive showing that, on one hand,
some correlation existed between prices and unobserved product characteristics included in the
error term ijt and these unobserved characteristics would enter positively in the utility function.
We would expect that product advertising increases the consumer utility and is also positively
correlated with price, giving an interpretation to this control function approach as in Petrin and
Train (2010).
Once we obtained demand estimates, we can compute price elasticities of demand for these
di¤erentiated products. We obtain for each market (period) a large set of own and cross price
elasticities for the 56 di¤erentiated products, that are summarized in Table 3. Table 3 presents
the average own and cross price elasticities by brand obtained with the estimates of the random
coe¢ cients logit model. Separating mineral waters from spring waters, we can observe that mineral
waters have on average larger own price elasticities (-6.7 on average versus -3.09). Moreover, cross
price elasticities of mineral waters with respect to spring waters are smaller than with respect
to other mineral waters and it is also true that spring waters are also more substitute among
themselves than across type of waters. Store brands correspond to brands 7 and 8 and on average
have smaller cross price elasticities that manufacturersbrands.
Table 3 : Average Own an Cross Price Elasticities by brand
Type Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5 Brand 6 Brand 7 Brand 8
Brand 1 MW -6.6645 0.0607 0.0822 0.0843 0.0798 0.0211 0.0896 0.0205
Brand 2 MW 0.1193 -7.7233 0.1134 0.1024 0.1154 0.0276 0.0978 0.0319
Brand 3 MW 0.0888 0.0731 -6.1269 0.0937 0.0889 0.0240 0.0989 0.0239
Brand 4 MW 0.1392 0.1108 0.1461 -5.6400 0.1457 0.0382 0.1563 0.0375
Brand 5 MW 0.1466 0.1281 0.1607 0.1635 -6.3078 0.0411 0.1705 0.0408
Brand 6 SW 0.0175 0.0172 0.0174 0.0174 0.0175 -2.4515 0.0174 0.0539
Brand 7 MW 0.0535 0.0354 0.0590 0.0688 0.0600 0.0173 -4.9186 0.0145
Brand 8 SW 0.0261 0.0213 0.0278 0.0291 0.0275 0.0856 0.0314 -3.0484
Notes : Each cell element represents the average elasticity of products of the brand in row w.r.t. products of brand in column.
Average over all products by brand and markets (periods). MW means mineral water and SW means spring water.
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4.3 Estimation of Price-Cost Margins
Once one has estimated the demand parameters, we can use the supply models described in
section 3 to compute the price-cost margins at the retailer and manufacturer levels for all products,
under the various classes of models considered. As we have seen, margins are identied in all supply
side models without cost side assumptions except in the case of two part tari¤s contracts with RPM,
where the identication of margins can only be obtained under additional cost side restrictions that
we describe here.
Indeed, in the case of two part tari¤s contracts with RPM, we use a specic form of the cost
side restriction (24) where we assume that there exists B +R parameters b, r such that
Cjt = jt + cjt = f(b(j) + r(j))pjt + jt for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T (27)
where jt is an uncorrelated shock and f(:) is such that f(x) = (1 + exp(x))
 1 (which proved to
be the preferred empirical specication among several others). This assumption means that the
expected total marginal cost Cjt is a share of retail price pjt which is non time varying, brand and
retailer specic. Then, using the moment condition (25) we are able to identify all parameters and
margins which amounts in this particular case to solve the minimization problem
min
f tgt;fb;rgb;r
X
j;t

pjt  Hj( t)  f(b(j) + r(j))pjt
2
(28)
where the mapping H(:) is given by (20). Remark that it remains an empirical question whether
this moment condition will point identify all parameters, as it will always depend on the empirical
shape of the mapping H(:) and on the cost restriction. Using inequality restrictions on the cost
structure would be an alternative using the framework of Pakes et al. (2015).
Table 4 shows the averages of the product level price-cost margins under the di¤erent models
considered. Model 1 concerns the case of linear pricing. In order to save space, variants of linear
pricing models are not presented although they have been estimated. As in Sudhir (2001), we
estimated linear pricing models with collusion between manufacturers and/or retailers or assuming
that retailers act as pass-through agents of marginal cost of production. All these models are
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nally strongly rejected and thus not shown. We also consider several non linear contracting models.
Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 correspond to two part tari¤s contracts with resale price maintenance. Remind
that, in this case, whether the retailers can use competing o¤ers to increase their buyer power when
dealing with manufacturers does not change the pricing equilibrium but only the unobserved and
unidentied xed fees which determine the sharing of the rent in the vertical structure. Thus,
these estimation results are consistent with a model where either the buyer power is endogenous
or exogenous in the vertical relationship (that is when the participation constraints are binding or
not). Model 2 is the general case (20) where the equilibrium wholesale margins are estimated using
an additional restriction (27) on total margins across products and markets. Model 3 corresponds
to the case where no wholesale price discrimination is imposed. In this model, manufacturers are
prevented to sell a given product to di¤erent retailers at di¤erent prices which implies that the
wholesale price of any product j depends only on its brand b(j) and not on the retailers identity
r(j). These restrictions are incorporated in the estimation of margins using (28) where the vector
of unknowns   is constrained to uniform wholesale pricing. The results of the estimation of models
2 and 3 show retail, wholesale and total margins obtained from this estimation (remind that for
private labels, total margins are equal to retail margin by convention and thus on average total
margins are lower than the sum of average retail and wholesale margins). In Model 4, we assume
that wholesale prices are equal to the marginal cost of production which corresponds to the case of
equation (21). Model 5 is the case where the wholesale prices are such that the retailersmargins
are zero. Finally, models 6 and 7 are the case of two part tari¤s contracts without resale price
maintenance either with exogenously determined buyer power (model 6) or with endogenously
determined buyer power (model 7).
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Table 4 : Estimation Results of Price-Cost Margins
Price-Cost Margins (% of retail price pjt) Mineral Water Spring Water
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Linear Pricing (Double Marginalization)
Model 1 Retailers 16.93 2.36 36.56 6.92
Manufacturers 23.35 4.14 44.12 5.98
Total 36.39 8.40 58.62 27.48
Two part Tari¤s with RPM
Model 2 General wholesale prices (wjt) with restriction (27)
Retailers 49.05 23.49 45.95 36.69
Manufacturers 5.25 21.43 21.43 41.14
Total 54.30 14.51 67.38 33.62
Model 3 No wholesale price discrimination (wb(j)t) with restriction (27)
Retailers 61.46 17.18 29.72 8.77
Manufacturers 0.00 0.00 44.32 45.47
Total 61.46 17.18 74.04 39.53
Model 4 Manufacturer marginal cost pricing (w = ) 66.32 19.08 78.18 41.04
Model 5 Zero retail margin (p = w + c) 25.53 5.07 43.39 14.40
Two-part Tari¤s without RPM
Exogenous Retail Buyer Power
Model 6 Retailers 16.93 2.36 36.56 6.92
Manufacturers 18.75 3.88 25.76 3.99
Total 32.56 6.58 49.44 18.21
Endogenous Retail Buyer Power
Model 7 Retailers 16.93 2.36 36.56 6.92
Manufacturers 21.71 6.39 49.53 13.71
Total 35.03 8.77 61.33 31.26
Notes : Means and standard deviations of margins across products and periods7
Interestingly, Table 4 shows that estimated margins are always between 0 and 100%, which is
not a constraint imposed by the supply model estimated. However, margins do vary a lot across
models. Margins vary also across products but on average, we nd that total price-cost margins in
percentage of retail price are lower for mineral water than for spring water but the share between
retail and wholesale varies substantially across models. Remind also that in the case of two part
tari¤s models, Table 4 does not show the estimated xed fees but only the retail and wholesale
margins that dont take into account the transfers between parties that can be positive or negative,
as we will show later in section 4.5.
7Note that the average price-cost margin at the retailer level plus the average price-cost margin at the manufac-
turer level do not sum to the total price cost margin because of the private labels products for which no price cost
margin at the manufacturer level is computed, the retailer price cost margin being then equal to the total price cost
margin.
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4.4 Testing Across Models
Then, in order to test between alternative models of price-cost margins estimated, we apply
non nested tests à la Vuong (1989) and Rivers and Vuong (2002). They allow to draw some
inference between any two alternative models for which we obtained total marginal costs. The tests
statistics are based on the di¤erence between the lack-of-t criterion of each cost equation that
can be estimated for each model once price-cost margins are obtained and some cost restrictions
are applied (see statistical details about the test in Appendix 6.4).
Indeed, after estimating the di¤erent price-cost margins for the models considered, one can
recover the total marginal cost Chjt as the di¤erence between observed price and total margin.
Remark that for all models, except models 2 and 3, we have not used any restriction on the
marginal costs to identify margins. In the case of models 2 and 3, we have used cost restrictions in
order to identify margins within the class of these models where manufacturers propose two part
tari¤s contracts with resale price maintenance. Thus, in order to test across models, including the
models 2 and 3, we use di¤erent cost restrictions that consist in using observed cost shifters and
thus project cost estimates in a di¤erent space so that the cost restrictions (27) imposed to identify
models 2 and 3 can be consistent with the other restrictions we now impose.
For such tests, we specify cost equations as follows, for models h = 1; :::; 7 :
lnChjt = 
hWjt + !
h
m(j) + !
h
r(j) + 
h
jt
where variables Wjt include interactions between product characteristics such as dummy variable
for spring water and mineral water and cost variables such as wages, and plastic price variables
(obtained from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)), h are
associated parameters, !hr are retailer xed e¤ects and !
h
m are manufacturer xed e¤ects. Actually,
it is likely that labor costs and plastic price (which is the major component of bottles and packa-
ging) are important determinants of variable costs. Moreover, we use an interaction with product
characteristics because we expect that the impact of input price variables vary between mineral
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and spring water (e.g., quality of plastic that may di¤er across products). Also, the relatively im-
portant variations of all these price indices over time suggests a potentially good identication of
our cost equations. Table 5 presents the results of these cost equations estimated by OLS for the
seven di¤erent models. Estimates of coe¢ cients are shown except for the too many xed e¤ects
coe¢ cients for which we present F tests of joint signicance.
Table 5 : Cost Equations for each Model
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WageSW -0.16 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.16 -0.15 -0.65
(Std. err.) (0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25 (0.25) (0.19)
WageMW -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.60
(Std. err.) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25) (0.26) (0.22)
PlasticSW 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.15
(Std. err.) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
PlasticMW 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.19
(Std. err.) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
All xed e¤ects !hm, !
h
r included are not shown
F test

!hm = 0
	
251.16 264.82 344.70 360.89 322.22 261.52 406.79
(p val.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
F test

!hr = 0
	
47.73 33.41 46.39 49.13 29.69 19.50 8.63
(p val.) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes : MW and SW are dummies for mineral water and spring water respectively.
We then perform the non nested test of Rivers and Vuong (2002). Results of the tests are
provided in Table 6. When the test statistic is negative and below the critical value chosen (-1.64
for a 5% signicance), it means that we reject H1 in favor of H2. When the test statistic is positive
and above the critical value chosen (1.64 for a 5% signicance), it means that we reject H2 in
favor of H1. When the test statistic is between the two critical values (-1.64,1.64), it means that
we cannot distinguish statistically H1 from H2.
Table 6 : Non Nested Tests Across Models
Tn ! N(0; 1)
 H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.10 0.71 0.28 7.48 4.25 -3.16
2 -3.79 -4.99 14.22 9.33 -2.51
3 -5.47 13.72 10.01 -2.37
4 13.14 9.85 -2.21
5 -11.38 -5.60
6 -3.99
Notes : Test statistic of the hypothesis H1 in column
in favor of the hypothesis H2 in row.
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The statistics of test Tn show that the best model appears to be the model 7 meaning that
manufacturers and retailers use two part tari¤s contracts without resale price maintenance (RPM)
and that the buyer power of retailers is a¤ected endogenously by the contractual competition of
manufacturers.
Thus, the preferred model on these data from 2006 is a model with two part tari¤ contract
without RPM which is consistent with the regulation in place after the reform of the Galland act
dening below cost pricing (Allain and Chambolle, 2011, Biscourp et al., 2013). Indeed, in 2005, the
Galland act was replaced by another law in order to redene resale at loss by retailers and prevent
the use of high wholesale prices to implement RPM (Allain and Chambolle, 2011). Actually, RPM
is in principle forbidden in France but the competition authority wisdom was that the Galland act
(in force between 1996 and 2005) allowed manufacturers to implement RPM equilibrium (which
is consistent with the evidence of Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). Indeed, the denition of thresholds
for resale at loss did not take into account backward margins and only wholesale unitary list
prices which could be set high to enforce minimum retail prices, while compensating retailers with
backward margins. After 2005, this became impossible because the denition of minimum retail
prices for resale at loss did include part of the backward margins. Recently, Biscourp et al. (2013)
shown with reduced form regressions that this legislation, which had the same e¤ect as allowing
industry-wide price oors, a¤ected prices in a way which is consistent with the theories on the
anti-competitive e¤ects of resale price maintenance in markets with interlocking relationships (Rey
and Vergé, 2010). Our tests based on data post 2005 and thus after the change in regulation are the
rst evidence that the regulatory change indeed seems to have succeeded in avoiding manufacturers
vertical contracting to mimic two part tari¤s contracts with RPM.
Looking at average price-cost margins for this preferred model, Table 4 shows that the average
price-cost margins are of 35.03% for mineral water and 61.33% for spring water. In absolute values,
the price-cost margins are on average 0.13e for mineral water and 0.09e for spring water because
mineral water is on average more expensive. For this preferred model, the average total price-cost
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margins for national brands is 48.2% while it is of 26.4% for private labels. Remark that the high
average margin for national brands is largely due to the only spring water national brand for which
the total margin is much larger than others8 . Otherwise, national brands of mineral water have an
average total margin of 39.05% with 16.39% for the retail margin and 22.66% for the wholesale
margin. However, the share of these "variable" margins across the manufacturers and retailers only
gives a partial picture of the contractual terms in the industry. Indeed, two part tari¤s contracts
also imply some xed fees along the vertical chain that we report and discuss in the next section.
4.5 Fixed Fees and Prots
We now present the estimated xed fees of the preferred model. As seen before, inference favors
vertical contracts that take the form of two part tari¤s contracts without resale price mainte-
nance where xed fees are determined by the buyer power of downstream retailers with respect to
upstream manufacturers. Once we know the vertical contracting model (either by observation or
using the inference based on cost restrictions proposed in section 4.4), the model allows to identify
margins and fees without any further assumption but the identied demand shape.
Remark that we have now to use total demanded quantities instead of market shares for each
sjt which simply amounts to re-scale by the total market size Mt which is xed such that the total
sales of bottles of water in our sample are representative of the French market using the household
consumer weights that allow our sample to be representative of the total French population.
As seen in section 3, removing time subscripts t for simplicity, we can identify the total fees
paid by a retailer r to a manufacturer f using
X
j2Gfr
Fj =
X
j2Sr
h
(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  (epfrj   wj   cj)sj(epfr)i
For notational simplicity, we denote Ffr 
P
j2Gfr Fj the total fees paid by retailer r to
manufacturer f (that could be negative if the manufacturer is paying the retailer some xed
transfer). Table 7 reports the average yearly total xed fees Ffr for each manufacturer-retailer
8There is a unique spring water national brand on the market for which total margins are relatively large. This
spring water comes from many springs located in di¤erent places in the country and is known to have thus low
transportation costs, and to use low quality low cost packaging.
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pair fr. We can see that total exchanged fees are substantial and mostly positive meaning that a
retailer pays some xed fees to manufacturers, except for retailer 2 who receives large xed fees
from all manufacturers and retailer 1 who gets also a large xed fee from manufacturers 1 and
3. The heterogeneity of contractual terms comes from the market structure and market demand.
Condence intervals reported in Table 9 in appendix 6.1 and show that results clearly allow to
identify fees that are signicantly di¤erent from zero, either positive or negative.
Then, as we can identify all xed fees as well as retail and wholesale margins, we can analyze the
distribution of prots among the vertical and horizontal structure as follows. For a given retailer
r, its prot r is
r =
X
j2Sr
[(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)] 
X
j2Sr
Fj
=
X
f
X
j2Gfr
[(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)]| {z }
rfr : retail variable prots on Gfr products
 
X
f
Ffr| {z }
fees paid by r to manufacturers
=
X
f
rfr  
X
f
Ffr
that is the sum over all manufacturers of retail variable prots obtained from products Gfr minus
total fees paid to manufacturers. On the manufacturer side, its prot f is
f =
X
j2Gf
[(wj   j)sj(p)] +
X
j2Gf
Fj
=
X
r
X
j2Gfr
[(wj   j)sj(p)]| {z }
wfr : wholesale variable prots on Gfr products
+
X
r
Ffr| {z }
fees collected by f from all retailers
=
X
r
wfr +
X
r
Ffr
that is the sum over all retailers of wholesale variable prots obtained from products Gfr plus total
fees received from retailers. Table 7 shows the average yearly values for all retailers, manufacturers
and manufacturer-retailer pairs of the retail (rfr), wholesale (
w
fr) variable prots, xed fees (Ffr)
as well as total fees and nally total prots net of xed fees9 . Table 10 and 11 in appendix 6.1
9Condence intervals of the wholesale and retail variable prots estimates are reported in Tables 10 and 11 in
Appendix, so that interpretation of results should be done with caution and with condence intervals.
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report the condence intervals for the manufacturer-retailer pairs of the retail (rfr), wholesale
(wfr) variable prots.
Table 7 : Average Yearly Prots Decomposition for each Manufacturer and Retailer
Totals by Retailer r
Manufacturer f Variable Total Total
Prot Fees Prot
Retailer r 1 2 3
P
f 
r
fr
P
f Ffr 
r
wfr 7; 159 23; 829 4; 009
1 rfr 8; 054 15; 632 3; 323 27; 009 28; 942
Ffr  1; 672 294  555  1; 933
wfr 14; 326 38; 775 6; 389
2 rfr 12; 837 23; 548 4; 997 41; 382 93; 362
Ffr  18; 910  15; 420  17; 650  51; 980
wfr 6; 542 19; 589 3; 348
3 rfr 6; 654 12; 121 2; 708 21; 483 17; 803
Ffr 1; 087 1; 378 1; 215 3; 680
wfr 8; 777 26; 631 4; 387
4 rfr 9; 680 17; 802 3; 683 31; 165 23; 501
Ffr 2; 509 2; 621 2; 534 7; 664
wfr 13; 609 41; 158 7; 654
5 rfr 16; 880 31; 075 6; 790 54; 745 49; 651
Ffr 3; 271 607 1; 216 5; 094
wfr 4; 415 13; 232 1; 956
6 rfr 3; 926 7; 324 1; 491 12; 741 9; 473
Ffr 1; 063 1; 114 1; 091 3; 268
wfr 4; 011 15; 106 1; 767 12; 714
7 rfr 3; 404 7; 869 1; 441 9; 726
Ffr 972 1; 016 1; 000 2; 988
Totals by manufacturer f
Variable Prot
P
r 
w
fr 58; 839 178; 320 29; 510
Total Fees
P
r Ffr  11; 680  8; 390  11; 149
Total Prot f 47; 159 169; 930 18; 361
Notes : Numbers are average per year in thousands of Euros.
Table 7 shows that xed transfers can account for very variable shares of total prots with
more than half of prot for the most protable retailer chain who obtains substantial backward
margins (negative xed fees in our model)10 . These backward margins paid by each of the three
manufacturers to retailer 2 are of the same order of magnitude but the wholesale variable prots
made with retailer 2 by these manufacturers vary from 6 to 38 millions euros. Backward margins
10As we are using proprietary data, we are not allowed to display manufacturers and retailers names and also
cannot develop too much interpretations relating prots to the shape of demand and to other characteristics of
retailers and manufacturers that would allow identify them.
38
that manufacturer 3 has to pay to retailer 2 is larger than the wholesale prot that this manufac-
turer obtains by retailing his products to retailer 2 (remark that there is no inconsistencies here
as it simply means that the manufacturer 3 would be even worse o¤ if not selling to retailer 2
who has large market share and could otherwise attract more consumers substituting away from
manufacturer 3 products sold in other retailers). This is the result of the buyer power of retailer 2
forcing the manufacturer to propose better contractual terms to itself rather than to retailers 3, 4,
5, 6, 7. The same appears to be true for the two other manufacturers who have to pay backward
margins to retailer 2 but of lower magnitude. Other retailer chains do not obtain backward margins
but have to pay xed fees that represent roughly between 10 and 25 percent of their variable retail
prot. On the manufacturer side, we obtain that overall they have negative net total xed fees
mainly because of one retailer chain that gets large backward margins while other retailers have
to pay xed fees. All manufacturers obtain the largest xed fees from retailer 3 but the largest
variable wholesale prots come from retailers 5 and 2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the rst empirical estimation of a structural model taking into
account explicitly the endogenous buyer power of downstream retailers in two part tari¤ contracts
between manufacturers and retailers. We show how to estimate di¤erent structural models embed-
ding the strategic relationships of upstream and downstream players, using demand estimates and
the industry structure. We consider several alternative models of competition between manufac-
turers and retailers on a di¤erentiated product market and test between these alternatives. We
study in particular several types of non linear pricing relationships with two part tari¤ contracts
allowing retailers to enjoy some endogenous buyer power, and where RPM may be used or not.
The method is implemented on the market for bottles of water in France in 2006 and estimates
of demand parameters using micro-data allow us to recover price-cost margins at the manufac-
turer and retailer levels as well as xed fees of non linear contracts for di¤erent models. We test
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between the di¤erent models of vertical contracts to select the one that bests ts the data. Our
empirical evidence allows to conclude that manufacturers and retailers use two part tari¤ contracts
without RPM and to identify the buyer power of retailers. Fixed fees of two part tari¤ contracts
are endogenously determined by the upstream horizontal competition between manufacturers and
allow to identify and estimate the sharing of prots on this market. The buyer power of retailers is
thus a¤ected endogenously by the o¤ers from other manufacturers. It does not come only from the
retailers private labels but from their ability to use competing o¤ers of manufacturers as outside
options. We obtain estimates of total xed fees and prots across manufacturers and retailers.
From an empirical point of view on food retailing in France, our results also shed some light on the
e¤ects of regulatory changes of below cost pricing that was implemented in January 2006. Actually,
previous research (Allain and Chambolle, 2011, Bonnet and Dubois, 2010, Biscourp et al. 2013)
have shown the anticompetitive e¤ects of the 1996 Galland act that dened resale at loss without
taking into account backward margins received by retailers and facilitated resale price maintenance
until 2005. This showed the importance of taking into account the widespread use of non linear
prices in vertical contracting. Our results post Galland Act, reformed in 2006, conrm that resale
price maintenance was not anymore at work. We obtain xed fees, margins and prots showing that
xed transfers can account for very variable share of total prot with more than half of prot for
the most protable retailer chain (in the sense of the chain having the largest total prot but not
as a share of capital that we dont observe) who obtains substantial backward margins (negative
xed fees in our model). Other retailer chains do not obtain backward margins but have to pay
xed fees that represent roughly between 10 and 25 percent of their variable retail prot. On the
manufacturer side, we obtain that overall they have negative net total xed fees mainly because of
one retailer chain that gets large backward margins while other retailers have to pay xed fees.
The method can be used for many sectors where non linear (two part tari¤) contracts are used. It
can be useful for competition and merger analysis where one needs identifying margins and prots.
Our modelling considered "bundling" contracts where manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers
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to retailers for their multiple products but generalizing to unbundled contracts is straightforward
even if more demanding in terms of empirical estimation. Considering unbundling is likely to
reinforce the buyer power of retailers, allowed to accept part of the brands of a manufacturer
instead of the whole bundle. Endogenizing the bundles of goods o¤ered to retailers as well as the
possible foreclosure e¤ects in this industry is an interesting research direction (Rey and Stiglitz,
1995, Rey and Tirole, 2007). The markets for bottles of water in France does not seem to be
importantly a¤ected by such strategies but other markets are (Asker, 2005) and further work
needs to be done in this direction. Another research direction concerns the questions of exclusivity
restrictions in vertical contracting and their role with buyer power as discussed in Marx and Sha¤er
(2007), Myklos-Thal, Rey, and Vergé (2011), and Rey and Whinston (2013) that provide interesting
framework but for which no structural empirical studies have been done yet.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Condence Interval Tables
Table 9 : Condence intervals for average yearly Fixed Fees Ffr
Manufacturer f
Retailer r 1 2 3
1 [-2,061 ; -1,232] [93 ; 735] [-944 ; -114]
2 [-19,530 ; -18,240] [-15,910 ; -14,660] [-18,220 ; -16,920]
3 [682 ; 1,443] [973 ; 1,734] [810 ; 1,571]
4 [2,017 ; 3,117] [2,129 ; 3,229] [2,041 ; 3,142]
5 [2,285 ; 4,255] [379 ; 1,591] [230 ; 2,201]
6 [855 ; 1,313] [906 ; 1,363] [883 ; 1,341]
7 [813 ; 1,119] [856 ; 1,163] [841 ; 1,147]
Notes : Numbers in brackets are Monte Carlo simulated 95% condence intervals
using variance of demand coe¢ cients (using 200 draws).
Table 10 : Condence intervals for average yearly wholesale variable prots wfr
Manufacturer f
Retailer r 1 2 3
1 [5,771.5 ; 8,404.4] [19,514.0 ; 28,308.9] [3,417.8 ; 4,625.3]
2 [11,788.7 ; 17,569.8] [33,125.6 ; 44,823.9] [5,458.1 ; 7,321.3]
3 [5,060.9 ; 8,238.3] [15,913.5 ; 23,708.1] [2,783.9 ; 4,019.7]
4 [7,149.5 ; 10,823.6] [22,068.0 ; 32,334.4] [3,728.4 ; 5,331.0]
5 [11,418.7 ; 16,677.2] [34,287.0 ; 49,065.6] [6,583.2 ; 8,729.1]
6 [3,572.4 ; 5,492.8] [10,790.9 ; 16,557.7] [1,586.3 ; 2,447.5]
7 [3,457.7 ; 4,653.0] [11,932.3 ; 18,679.3] [1,589.4 ; 1,965.8]
Notes : Numbers in brackets Monte Carlo simulated 95% condence intervals
using variance estimates of demand coe¢ cients (200 draws).
Table 11 : Condence intervals for average yearly retail variable prots rfr
Manufacturer f
Retailer r 1 2 3
1 [6,380.2 ; 9,782.6] [12,415.2 ; 18,874.1] [2,842.2 ; 3,867.9]
2 [10,004.8 ; 16,303.3] [19,404.9 ; 28,479.5] [4,208.7 ; 5,923.9]
3 [5,117.4 ; 8,442.2] [9,681.4 ; 14,978.4] [2,191.3 ; 3,216.5]
4 [7,628.6 ; 12,230.4] [14,255.8 ; 22,146.8] [3,051.6 ; 4,568.2]
5 [13,771.4 ; 21,275.0] [24,471.9 ; 37,933.6] [5,709.5 ; 7,985.2]
6 [3,177.0 ; 5,056.2] [5,815.4 ; 9,309.9] [1,178.1 ; 1,890.7]
7 [2,905.0 ; 3,984.8] [5,864.4 ; 10,362.1] [1,315.7 ; 1,602.4]
Notes : Numbers in brackets Monte Carlo simulated 95% condence intervals
using variance estimates of demand coe¢ cients (200 draws)
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6.2 First stage estimation
Table 8 : First stage OLS regression of prices
Dependent variable : pjt Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Wage index 0.0037*** (0.0008)
Plastic price -0.0003 (0.0008)
Diesel oil price 0.0007* (0.0004)
b(j), r(j) are not shown
N 728
R2 0.98
Notes : *, **, *** mean signicance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.
6.3 Detailed resolution of system of equations
Generically we have systems of equations to be solved of the form

Af ( +  ) +Bf = 0
for f = 1; ::; G
where Af and Bf are some given matrices.
Solving this system amounts to solve the following minimization problem
min
+ 
XG
f=1
[Af ( +  ) +Bf ]
0
[Af ( +  ) +Bf ]
leads to the rst order conditions
XG
f=1
A0fAf

( +  ) 
XG
f=1
A0fBf = 0
that allow to nd the following expression for its solution
( +  ) =
XG
f=1
A0fAf
 1XG
f=1
A0fBf
6.4 Non Nested Tests
Denoting  hjt and 
h
jt the wholesale and retail margins of product j in period t under the supply
model h, and lets consider two models h and h0 with
pjt =  
h
jt + 
h
jt +

exp(!hj +W
0
jth)

hjt
and
pjt =  
h0
jt + 
h0
jt +
h
exp(!h
0
j +W
0
jth0)
i
h
0
jt :
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Non-nested tests (Vuong, 1989, and Rivers and Vuong, 2002) are then applied to infer which
model h is statistically the best. The test of Vuong (1989) applies in the context of maximum
likelihood. Rivers and Vuong (2002) generalized this kind of test to a broad class of estimation
methods including nonlinear least squares. These test involve testing one model against each other
without requiring that either competing model be correctly specied under the null hypothesis.
Other approaches such as Coxs tests (see, among others, Smith, 1992) require such an assumption.
Taking any two competing models h and h0, the null hypothesis is that the two non-nested
models are asymptotically equivalent when
H0 : lim
n!1
n
Qhn(h; !
h
j )  Qh
0
n (h0 ; !
h0
j )
o
= 0
where Qhn(h; !
h
j ) (resp. Q
h0
n (h0 ; !
h0
j )) is the expectation of a lack-of-t criterion Q
h
n(h; !
h
j ) eva-
luated for model h (resp. h0) at the pseudo-true values denoted h, !hj (resp. h0 , !
h0
j ). The rst
alternative hypothesis is that h is asymptotically better than h0 when
H1 : lim
n!1
n
Qhn(h; !
h
j )  Qh
0
n (h0 ; !
h0
j )
o
< 0:
Similarly, the second alternative hypothesis is that h0 is asymptotically better than h. The test
statistic Tn is dened as a suitably normalized di¤erence of the sample lack-of-t criteria, i.e.
Tn =
p
n
^hh
0
n
n
Qhn(
bh; b!hj ) Qh0n (bh0 ; b!h0j )o where Qhn(bh; b!hj ) (resp. Qh0n (bh0 ; b!h0j )) is the sample
lack-of-t criterion evaluated for model h (resp. h0) at the estimated values of the parameters of
this model, denoted by bh; b!hj (resp. bh0 ; b!h0j ). ^hh0n denotes the estimated value of the variance
of the di¤erence in lack-of-t. As our models are strictly non-nested, Rivers and Vuong showed
that the asymptotic distribution of the Tn statistic is standard normal distribution. The selection
procedure involves comparing the sample value of Tn with critical values of the standard normal
distribution11 .
11 If  denotes the desired size of the test and t=2 the value of the inverse standard normal distribution evaluated
at 1  =2. If Tn < t=2 H0 is rejected in favor of H1 ; if Tn > t=2 H0 is rejected in favor of H2. Otherwise, H0 is
not rejected.
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